We examine how humanity can best
reduce suffering

Our mission is to identify cooperative and effective strategies to reduce involuntary suffering. We believe that in a complex world where the long-run consequences of our actions are highly uncertain, such an undertaking requires foundational research. Currently, our research focuses on reducing risks of dystopian futures in the context of emerging technologies. Together with others in the effective altruism community, we want careful ethical reflection to guide the future of our civilization to the greatest extent possible.

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Multiverse-wide Cooperation via Correlated Decision Making

Some decision theorists argue that when playing a prisoner's dilemma-type game against a sufficiently similar opponent, we should cooperate to make it more likely that our opponent also cooperates. This idea, which Hofstadter calls superrationality, has strong implications when combined with the insight from modern physics that we live in a large universe or multiverse of some sort.

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Gains from Trade through Compromise

When agents of differing values compete, they may often find it mutually advantageous to compromise rather than continuing to engage in zero-sum conflicts. Potential ways of encouraging cooperation include promoting democracy, tolerance and (moral) trade. Because a future without compromise could be many times worse than a future with it, advancing compromise seems an important undertaking.

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FROM OUR BLOG

22 February 2019

Risk factors for s-risks

Traditional disaster risk prevention has a concept of risk factors. These factors are not risks in and of themselves, but they increase either the probability or the magnitude of a risk. For instance, inadequate governance structures do not cause a specific disaster, but if a disaster strikes it may impede an effective response, thus increasing the damage. Rather than considering individual scenarios of how s-risks could occur, which tends to be highly speculative, this post instead looks at risk factors – i.e. factors that would make s-risks more likely or more severe.

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3 July 2018

Challenges to implementing surrogate goals

Surrogate goals might be one of the most promising approaches to reduce (the disvalue resulting from) threats. The idea is to add to one’s current goals a surrogate goal that one did not initially care about, hoping that any potential threats will target this surrogate goal rather than what one initially cared about. In this post, I will outline two key obstacles to a successful implementation of surrogate goals.

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29 March 2018

A framework for thinking about AI timescales

To steer the development of powerful AI in beneficial directions, we need an accurate understanding of how the transition to a world with powerful AI systems will unfold. A key question is how long such a transition (or “takeoff”) will take.

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NEW RESEARCH

Approval-directed agency and the decision theory of Newcomb-like problems

The quest for artificial intelligence poses questions relating to decision theory: How can we implement any given decision theory in an AI? Which decision theory (if any) describes the behavior of any existing AI design? This paper examines which decision theory (in particular, evidential or causal) is implemented by an approval-directed agent, i.e., an agent whose goal it is to maximize the score it receives from an overseer.

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Robust program equilibrium

One approach to achieving cooperation in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma is Tennenholtz’s program equilibrium, in which the players of a game submit programs instead of strategies. These programs are then allowed to read each other’s source code to decide which action to take. Unfortunately, existing cooperative equilibria are either fragile or computationally challenging and therefore unlikely to be realized in practice. This paper proposes a new, simple, more efficient program to achieve more robust cooperative program equilibria.

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